Article 5 of the Administrative Liability Law defines an administrative offence as unlawful, culpable conduct for which liability is provided for in law — the conduct described by Abu Meri does not bear such features.
Article 14 provides for a warning, a fine, deprivation of rights and a prohibition on exercising rights, but none of these sanctions is applicable to leaving a party post.
Abu Meri's decision to step down from the post of Chairman of the Riga City Council of "Unity" and to withdraw from active party work creates a purely political and intra-party situation, rather than any set of legal consequences regulated by the available sources of law. The essence of the news is the voluntary course of an official and party functionary following the elections to the 15th Saeima, in which, as a JV candidate, he received the most preferential votes — 3,369 — and the party won only seven mandates. The persons mentioned in this story — Abu Meri as Minister for Health, the JV board and the council — face political responsibility, not administrative, criminal or any other form of state-imposed responsibility. The legal question a reader might ask — whether leaving a ministerial or party post gives rise to any consequences prescribed by law — cannot be answered on the basis of the sources provided, since all fourteen sources are excerpts from the Administrative Liability Law, which regulates administrative offences, types of sanctions and procedure. Article 5 of the Administrative Liability Law defines an administrative offence as a person's unlawful, culpable act for which administrative liability is provided for in law or in regulations binding on municipalities — the conduct described in Abu Meri's statement does not bear such features. Likewise, Article 4(1) links liability to a regulatory act in force at the time the offence was committed, but here the offence itself cannot be identified.
Applying the sources provided to this situation, it must be concluded that they do not fit this case. Article 14 of the Administrative Liability Law provides for four types of sanction — a warning, a fine, deprivation of rights and a prohibition on exercising rights — but none of them is applicable to a person for an election result or for leaving a party post, since there is no specific statutory element of an offence. Article 2 provides that the system of administrative liability consists of regulatory acts in which offences, sanctions and procedure are prescribed, and Article 4(3) indicates that specific offences and the competence of officials are determined by the laws regulating the relevant sector — among the sources there is no sectoral provision that would regulate the termination of a minister's mandate or the internal governance of a party. Likewise, the party's internal council and board operate according to their own internal organisational order, which the sources provided do not regulate. Abu Meri's statement that he will perform the minister's duties until the formation of the new government is a political assurance whose legal framework is not reflected in the sources. Nor do the sources contain case law on similar political decisions; the Constitutional Court materials provided, [14] and [18], concern appeals against administrative sanctions and the application of Article 6 of the Convention in administrative offences, which are unrelated to this news item.
Practically, this news item means that subsequent developments will take place within a political, not an administrative, process. What matters most to the reader is that the functions of the Minister for Health continue for the time being: Abu Meri has confirmed that he will perform them until the formation of the new government and will hand over the work to a new minister. Within the party, an evaluation of the election results and of the work done to date has already begun, the outcome of which will depend on JV's internal procedures. At the state level, the next step is the consultations initiated by President Rinkēvičs with the parties elected to the 15th Saeima. The sources provided do not offer any specific procedural document related to the termination of the minister's mandate. If, in the future, news appeared on this topic concerning a specific administrative offence or sanction, then Articles 14–16 of the Administrative Liability Law and Article 153 on the content of a decision would respectively apply, but at present no such basis can be identified.
Under the first part of Article 38 of the Saeima Election Law, lists that have received less than 5% of the total number of votes cast throughout Latvia — the total number of valid envelopes — do not participate in the allocation of deputy seats.
CVK decisions on the redistribution of mandates may be appealed to court within 10 days, after which the decision passes to the Saeima Mandate and Petitions Committee.
After the 15th Saeima elections, readers are most interested in who and how will now decide who forms the government — and the legal answer is: not the president alone, but the Saeima majority, which the president merely helps to assemble. Key facts: President Rinkēvičs began consultations with the elected parties on Monday; AS has won 41 seats, and voter turnout was 51.8%. Consultations are not the granting of a mandate — it is a political process whose outcome must be formalized at a sitting of the Saeima by confirming the Prime Minister with a majority of votes. The legal situation facing the parties is the conversion of coalition negotiation results into a majority of deputies' votes, because without it no government configuration will function. The direct legal question arising from this story is the procedure for the distribution of seats and the legalization of deputies' mandates, which is governed by the norms of the Saeima Election Law: Article 38 sets out the five-percent threshold and the Sainte-Laguë method (division by 1, 3, 5, 7), Article 41 provides for replacement when a deputy loses a mandate, and Article 52.2 sets out the roles of the Mandate and Petitions Committee and the Saeima in the redistribution of mandates.
Under the procedure laid down in the second part, votes are divided successively by 1, 3, 5, 7 and so on, the quotients are ranked in descending order, and seats are allocated to the lists with the largest quotients (points 2–4 of the second part of Article 38). If the boundary quotient is equal to the next quotients, the seat goes to the list that has received more votes throughout Latvia; if registered in only one constituency — to the list registered first. If a deputy has died, declined, or otherwise lost the mandate, the next candidate from the same list takes his or her place (Article 41), and if candidates are lacking, the next deputy is determined from another list in accordance with the procedure of Article 38 (Article 42). The Saeima Mandate and Petitions Committee announces the CVK decision at the next sitting of the Saeima, and if the Saeima supports it, upon the moment of announcement the previous deputy's mandate terminates and the Presidium invites the new deputy to take office (Article 52.2). Voter turnout of 51.8% does not affect the distribution of mandates — the total number of votes cast consists of the number of valid envelopes regardless of the level of turnout. Coalition formation and the possibility of a minority government are not directly regulated by these sources — that falls within the sphere of the Constitution and the Saeima Rules of Procedure, not the Election Law.
For the parties, in the coming weeks the critical moment will be not to contest the CVK decisions on the distribution of mandates, since only thereafter are mandates formalized without litigation risk. Practically significant:
Under Section 14(4) of the Law on the Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Cabinet is deemed to be formed only if the Saeima has expressed confidence to all of the ministers referred to in Section 5(1) collectively.
During the transitional period, the duties of a minister are performed by the Prime Minister or a person appointed by the Prime Minister to act in that capacity (Section 11), and such a minister may not adopt decisions that are not urgent and that may significantly affect the development of the state.
Following the elections to the 15th Saeima, Latvia faces a government formation procedure whose outcome depends on whether the "United List" (AS), as the winner of the elections with 41 of the 100 Saeima seats, can secure majority support. The announcement of the NA's readiness to join a coalition means that one of the potential majority blocs has declared its position, but legally no government yet exists — until a vote of confidence is expressed in the Saeima, the previous Cabinet of Ministers remains in office. The specific legal question is: in what procedure is the Cabinet of Ministers formed, and what happens to the existing government during the transitional period. This is governed by the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia and the Law on the Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers, primarily Sections 14 (formation of the Cabinet), 15 (the Declaration) and 17 (assumption of office by members).
Under Section 14(1) of the Law on the Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers, the candidate for the office of Prime Minister submits to the State President and the Speaker of the Saeima the Declaration and a draft Saeima decision on the expression of confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers. The procedure continues as follows:
The further course of events depends on the proposal being prepared by the AS candidate for Prime Minister (Andris Kulbergs, mentioned in the report):
Article 7.2(1) of the Law would require submitting a written application to KNAB within 20 days of the announcement of the results, but due to failure to overcome the 2% barrier, this procedure is not relevant for "Stabilitātei!".
Article 7.3(3.1) of the Law allows KNAB, upon information from the Saeima, to discontinue the disbursement of funding if the faction's operation ceases — this explains the already reduced funding prior to these elections.
The party "Stabilitātei!", which received 1.997% of voter support in the 15th Saeima elections, will reportedly not be granted state budget funding from 2027 onwards, and its future operation will depend solely on private funding sources permitted by law. The actual core of the news is simple: Chulkova announces that the party will continue operating without state money, relying on membership fees. The legal question is twofold — whether the party truly has no entitlement to state funding, and what funding sources and restrictions apply if it operates without it. The answer follows from the Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties) (hereinafter — the Law), primarily the provisions of Articles 7.1, 7.2 and 2 thereof.
Article 7.1 of the Law provides that state budget funding is granted to parties for which more than 2% of voters voted in the Saeima elections. "Stabilitātei!" received 1.997%, so the threshold was not met and there is no basis for granting state funding. The party's continued operation without state money is lawful and normally regulated. Article 2(1) of the Law permits four funding sources:
The restrictions of the Law apply to these sources: in cash, one person may pay up to one minimum monthly wage per calendar year, with subsequent payments only via bank transfer (Article 9); financing through third-party intermediaries is prohibited, including a donation made with another person's identity data (Article 9(3)). Thus, "membership fees only" means that every payment must be documented and transparent, and KNAB's oversight extends to private sources as well. It should also be noted that the dissolution of the faction, which Chulkova mentioned in connection with the already reduced funding, has consequences. Article 7.3(3.1) of the Law (source [11]) provides that KNAB, upon receiving information from the Saeima, adopts a decision to discontinue the disbursement of state budget funding if the operation of the party's faction formed in the Saeima ceases or if the number of the faction's deputies decreases by more than two-thirds. Thus, the dissolution of the faction in the 14th Saeima was an independent ground for discontinuing the funding, separate from the 2% barrier in the subsequent elections. Financial planning without state money also means that some norms will apply to the party only partially. The Rules on the Use of State Budget Funding Granted to Political Organisations (Parties) (source [1]) regulate only the purpose categories of the granted state funding and the submission of justification documents for its use to KNAB — since no funding will be granted, these rules will practically not apply to "Stabilitātei!". In turn, the purpose categories under Article 7.4 of the Law (office maintenance, substantive activity) relate to state funding, not to membership fees, the use of which is governed by the general provisions of the Law.
Practical consequences for the party:
Alternatives that the sources allow to be anticipated: if "Stabilitātei!" merged with another party that receives state funding, the funding would not be aggregated — the funding of the acceding party is not added (Article 7.5(4), source [16]), so a merger would not resolve the funding issue in its favour either. Conversely, if the party split, the newly formed parties would not receive state funding (Article 7.5(6), source [13]). For the party's members and donors, it is significant that private funding is entirely lawful, but any violation could constitute grounds for sanctions under the Law. For voters and competitors, it is relevant that the party's financial activity remains under KNAB oversight even without state money.
Correction. The article states that a party "receives funding annually for each vote obtained", which creates the impression that the votes are counted afresh every year. The text of the Law clarifies the position: 0.9 per cent of the minimum monthly wage is calculated for each vote obtained by the party in the most recent Saeima elections — only the amount of the minimum wage changes, not the number of votes. Secondly, the article mentions a "maximum ceiling limit" of 1,600 minimum monthly wages but fails to mention that this cap derives from the Law, and that it is likewise prohibited to spend the funding outside the categories of purposes prescribed in the Cabinet of Ministers regulations. Thirdly, the article mentions the New Conservative Party's debt of EUR 40,000 but provides no regulatory context: the repayment of overspent state funding is a consequence of a violation of the law, monitored by KNAB, and the allocation of new funding may be affected where violations of the Financing Law have been established in respect of the party.
Under Article 7.2(1), the party submits a written application to KNAB within 20 days of the announcement of the election results, and applications submitted after this deadline are not accepted.
Article 7.4(6) sets an annual ceiling of 1,600 minimum monthly wages, which for the winning party limits the amount to approximately EUR 1.3 million.
Following the 15th Saeima elections, the parties await not only a redistribution of political weight but also a strictly regulated flow of state money, whose amount and use are governed by the Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties). The legal question is: which organisations acquire the right to state budget funding, to what extent, and subject to what restrictions on its use — and this is resolved under Article 7.2 and Article 7.4 of that law. Importantly, the funding is not automatic: the party itself must take the required actions within the prescribed time limits. The two per cent threshold and the 0.9% of the minimum wage per vote mentioned in the report are components of the statutory formula for measuring voter support.
The allocation procedure begins with the party's own action:
The party's rights as to use are restricted. Article 7.4(1) permits only three categories of purposes: maintenance of offices and staff, substantive support of activities, and communication with the public. Article 7.4(1.2) provides that no more than 60% of the funding for the relevant year may be spent on each category of purposes. Any allocated but unspent portion of a year's funding may be used within the following three calendar years; if this is not done, the unspent amount must be returned to the state budget by 15 January of the following year. The total annual amount for a single organisation may not exceed 1,600 minimum monthly wages (Article 7.4(6)). Payments may be made only by non-cash transfer from the separate account, and the party submits supporting expenditure documents to KNAB once a year. Unions of parties face an additional restriction: a union's funding is prohibited from being used for the campaigning of its constituent parties where those parties run in Saeima elections with separate candidate lists. The debt situation referred to in the report concerning the New Conservative Party means, as a matter of law, that absent new funding, the only remaining sources of repayment are membership fees and donations from natural persons, the aggregate amount of which from one person per year may not exceed 30% of that person's income for the previous year.
Practical course of events:
Newcomers, such as the MMN mentioned in the report, must bear in mind that the use of the funding will be fully documented and verifiable by KNAB, and that any unspent portion will return to the budget after three years. For parties indebted to the state, the absence of new funding means that their own revenues will have to be used to service the debt.