Section 56.2(1) of the Financial Instruments Market Law imposes on a capital company whose securities are admitted to a regulated market the obligation to prepare a corporate governance statement, and subsection (4) applies this requirement also to shares traded in a multilateral trading system.
Section 245(2) of the Commercial Law requires that the terms of issuance of convertible bonds specify the number of bonds, the nominal value, the price, the conversion period, interest, the payment procedure, and the procedure by which the bonds are exchanged for shares.
For a company choosing between a bank loan, a bond issuance, and a fund investment, the legal position differs according to how severely the regulation restricts freedom of action and how much information must be disclosed. The article's practical conclusion — that a bank requires collateral, bonds require transparency, and a fund requires governance — legally means that the choice is not merely a matter of price: each type of financing places the company within the scope of operation of different regulatory instruments. The specific legal question arising in this narrative is what disclosure and governance obligations apply to a company entering an exchange market, and what conditions must be recorded in bond issuance documents. These questions are resolved on the basis of Sections 56.1 and 56.2 of the Financial Instruments Market Law (corporate governance statement), Section 245 of the Commercial Law (convertible bond issuance terms), and the Law on the Governance of Capital Shares of Public Persons and Capital Companies. Additional contours are provided by the Law on the Control of Support for Commercial Activity, which regulates the transparency of state funding allocations, and the Credit Risk Management Regulations, which determine what a bank itself may and may not do with credit risk.
For a company whose securities are admitted to a regulated market, Section 56.2(1) of the Financial Instruments Market Law imposes an obligation to prepare a corporate governance statement. Subsection (2) requires that the statement contain sufficiently clear, accurate and comprehensive information on the governance model, the application of corporate governance recommendations, the capital structure, and the persons holding shares. It may also include information on the key elements of the internal control and risk management system in relation to the preparation of financial statements, a description of the composition and operation of the governing bodies and their committees, as well as justification where the recommendations are not applied at all. Where shares are traded only in a multilateral trading system (e.g., First North), subsection (4) applies the same requirements to such a company — this directly affects CleanR Grupa's first issuance model. Additional obligations are set out in the Law on the Governance of Capital Shares of Public Persons and Capital Companies, which requires the continuous updating of information on atypical or significant-volume transactions with related parties within the meaning of Section 59.1 of the Financial Instruments Market Law for at least the past five years, as well as the most significant policies on risk management and the prevention of conflicts of interest. The content of bond issuance documents is characterised by Section 245(2) of the Commercial Law: the decision on the issuance of convertible bonds approves the issuance terms, which must specify the number of bonds, the nominal value, the price, the conversion period, interest, the payment procedure, and the procedure by which the bonds are exchanged for shares. This corresponds to the warning highlighted in the article that covenants and early redemption conditions must be considered already upon entering the market. On the bank's side, the Credit Risk Management Regulations (issued pursuant to Section 34.2(4) and Section 55 of the Credit Institutions Law) establish minimum requirements for credit risk management, asset quality assessment and provisioning, and point 5 requires compliance with these regulations both individually and at the level of the prudential consolidation group. This explains why a bank lends cautiously and against collateral: its credit portfolio is subject to prudential supervision. In the case of state-supported financing, the Law on the Control of Support for Commercial Activity requires disclosure of the allocation conditions, interest rates, guarantees, and information on equity or quasi-equity funds, indicating the relationship between the grantor and the recipient of the funding; the application of the provision is excluded where the average turnover over the previous two years is less than EUR 40 million or the amount of funds is less than EUR 800 million. The sanctions risk management requirements to which the article refers in the context of the fund's and the bank's due diligence are also enshrined in the Payment Services and Electronic Money Law, which requires capital companies to have policies and procedure descriptions for anti-money-laundering and sanctions risk internal control systems within the meaning of the Law on International and Latvian National Sanctions.
The practical course of events for a company choosing a financing route is as follows:
For driving a moped where the detected blood alcohol concentration exceeds 1.5 per mille, a fine of 240 to 400 fine units is imposed, together with the revocation of the right to drive vehicles for five years.
Under Article 76(3) of the Road Traffic Law, administrative offence proceedings for the offences specified in Articles 74–78 are conducted by the municipal police; therefore, the Mārupe municipal police is empowered to independently initiate proceedings for these offences.
Young people in Mārupe who ride scooters and mopeds and disturb residents' peace face not merely a conversation with a police officer, but administrative liability involving specific fines and the revocation of driving rights. The 44 administrative offence proceedings mentioned in the news report are only the beginning — the law also permits punishment for reckless driving with serious consequences, up to and including the revocation of driving rights for five years. The legal questions raised here are twofold: what liability applies to minors and young moped drivers, and what is the municipality's competence in supervising such offences. The basis of liability is set out in Articles 50–55 of the Road Traffic Law and Article 19 of the Administrative Liability Law, while procedural competence is governed by Article 76(3) of the Road Traffic Law, which provides that administrative offence proceedings for several of the offences listed in that law are conducted by the municipal police.
The municipal police's actions in Mārupe rest directly on the rule on the division of competence. Article 16(4) of the Administrative Liability Law further provides that a municipal council may establish administrative liability in binding regulations in the cases provided for in the Law on Municipalities. The sanction is determined by Article 19 of the Administrative Liability Law: a penalty is imposed within the limits set by law or by municipal binding regulations, taking into account the nature of the offence, the person's character, financial situation, and mitigating circumstances. Account must also be taken of Article 50 of the Road Traffic Law: the administrative penalties established in that Chapter are not applied to the driver of a bicycle or electric scooter, except where their liability is expressly provided for in the relevant sanction. On the other hand, for offences committed by the driver of a bicycle or electric scooter, proceedings may in certain cases also be conducted by the State Border Guard, where the offences are detected during control measures (Article 76(2)).
The practical consequences for young people and their parents are as follows:
Where a breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects, the controller shall inform the data subjects themselves in accordance with Article 34(1) GDPR, and the supervisory authority no later than within 72 hours in accordance with Article 33(1) GDPR.
The DVI may conduct inspections, initiate administrative violation proceedings and request information from private persons free of charge in order to verify a controller's compliance with the requirements of regulatory enactments.
At present, no personal data of Latvian travellers has been identified on the Russian black-market platform, which means that the data protection supervisory mechanism in Latvia has not yet been activated — the State Data Protection Inspectorate (DVI) cannot commence examination of a violation until there is either a notification from controllers or actual evidence of harm to Latvian data subjects. The essence of the news is not a violation committed against Latvian residents, but rather a moment of scrutiny: the data of Lithuanian travellers, including names, dates of birth, telephone numbers and passport information concerning journeys from 2012 to 2026, are already publicly available, and the leak of such a data set raises the question of whether it also contains data of Latvian clients that tour operators and agencies have failed to report. The legal questions would be resolved by Article 4 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 5 GDPR, Article 33 GDPR, as well as the provisions of the Personal Data Processing Law concerning the competence of the State Data Protection Inspectorate to conduct inspections and administrative violation proceedings.
If it were to transpire that the leaked data contain personal data of Latvian clients, the tour operators and agencies processing them would have been under an obligation to:
The competence of the DVI derives from the Personal Data Processing Law, under which the Inspectorate may conduct inspections, initiate administrative violation proceedings, request information and documents from private persons free of charge, and also visit commercial and other non-residential premises in order to verify a controller's compliance with the requirements of regulatory enactments. The Inspectorate also cooperates with foreign data protection supervisory authorities, which means that in this situation cooperation with the Lithuanian data protection authority, within whose jurisdiction the principal affected controllers are located, would be essential. Data subjects, for their part, have the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority (Article 13(d) GDPR), to request access to their data, their rectification or erasure, as well as the restriction of processing. The fact that service providers have not notified the DVI indicates one of two scenarios: either the data of Latvian clients are in fact not affected, or the controllers have fulfilled their notification obligation incompletely or have not assessed the risk to their Latvian clients at all.
The practical consequences at present primarily affect Lithuanian clients and market participants — "Tez Tour", "Join Up" and the agencies cooperating with them, which will have to reckon with inspections by data protection supervisory authorities and potential liability. On the Latvian side, the consequences are for now indirect:
The further course of events in this matter depends on two occurrences: concrete evidence concerning the data of Latvian clients coming into the DVI's possession, or the tour operator itself reporting the breach. Until either occurs, the DVI can confirm neither the harm nor its possible extent — this is also stated in the authority's official response.
In an administrative offence case concerning speeding, can the fact of the offence and the liability of the accused person be established without using data from technical control devices (speed cameras) prescribed by regulatory enactments, but instead on the basis of a video recording published by the offender himself and the totality of other evidence?
Legal basis: The evidence provided does not include an extract of the specific provision, so I rely on general principles of law, which I state openly. The Administrative Liability Law provides: "Information on facts obtained by private persons may be used as evidence if such information can be verified within the framework of administrative offence proceedings." This means that the legislator does not tie the type of evidence exclusively to technical control devices — evidence may also include material obtained by a private person, provided it is verifiable within the proceedings. In this case, such a principle was applied in establishing a speeding offence in a built-up area (an excess of more than 60 km/h), first on the basis of a video recording published by the driver himself on social media, which was subsequently verified by the prosecution in administrative proceedings. It was the closely interlinked body of evidence, rather than a single isolated source, that formed the basis for imposing the maximum fine of EUR 680 and a 12-month prohibition on driving a vehicle.
What case law says: The decision of the Zemgale Regional Court of 22 October 2026 upheld the prosecutor's protest and imposed the maximum penalty, the court finding that the offence was socially dangerous and that the publication of the video demonstrated disrespect for legal norms. This is the first case of this type highlighted in this material, so it is not yet possible to speak of uniform practice — it remains to be seen whether similar video recordings will be regarded as a sufficient evidentiary basis in other regional court proceedings.
Correction: The prosecution's assertion that the fact of speeding can be proven "not only with speed camera data" is true but incomplete — the article does not explain the legal basis. It should be formulated more precisely: the Administrative Liability Law permits the use of information obtained by private persons as evidence if it is verifiable within administrative offence proceedings; therefore, the use of a video recording is neither an exception nor a new principle, but an evidentiary procedure already provided for by law. Secondly, the article describes the decision as a "significant legal precedent", although in Latvia decisions in administrative cases are not officially binding as precedents — it would be more accurate to speak of practice worth citing. Thirdly, the article fails to mention that the offence dates back to March 2024 and that the decision was adopted only following the prosecutor's protest, which points to a prolonged course of proceedings and an initially questionable assessment of the evidence.
Practical significance: The most significant practical change concerns the range of means of proof: the prosecution and authorities may now substantiate administrative liability cases with recordings published on social media, provided they can be verified in the proceedings, and the accused party can no longer defend itself by arguing that there was no speed camera recording. Accordingly, the mistake made on the drivers' side was the publication of the offence itself — it became the principal piece of evidence and an aggravating circumstance (the court qualified it as a demonstrated permissiveness, justifying the maximum fine of EUR 680 and the 12-month prohibition). Attention should also be paid to the time-limit aspect: the offence occurred in March 2024 and the decision was adopted in October 2026, so the duration of case handling and the application of time limits in administrative proceedings will constitute a separate point of dispute worth following in subsequent decisions and, if filed, in the cassation or appellate instance.
Correction. The claim in the report that the supervision and control of parties is exercised only by the prosecution and the state security authorities is incomplete — Section 38(1) also lists the KNAB, the VID and the party register authority as supervisory bodies, each within its own competence. It should likewise be clarified that Section 45(2) does not confer a right to "initiate liquidation" in a loose sense: an application to the court may be filed both by the authorities listed in Section 38(1) and by the prosecutor, and the ground is the circumstance established in point 3.1 — the incompatibility of the activities with the Constitution or with the prohibition in Section 7(4) — rather than merely an abstract "detection of a violation". The prosecutor is not bound by the evidence of the applicant; he or she independently assesses whether there are indications warranting a warning to the party or an application to the court.
If the court dissolves the party, it additionally orders the appointment of a liquidator and may order the forfeiture of the party's property to the State unless the law provides otherwise.
If the party violates the suspension order during the court proceedings, the court imposes a procedural sanction — a warning or a fine — and warns of criminal liability.
The party "Suverēnā vara" faces not immediate dissolution but a multi-stage review that may conclude with suspension of its activities, dissolution, and forfeiture of its property to the State. The Prosecutor General's Office, upon a submission by the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB), has commenced a review — the first procedural step toward a possible court action. The essential legal question is twofold: whether the party's activities contravene the prohibition in Section 7(4) of the Law on Political Parties against acting against Latvia's independence and territorial integrity, and whether its financing, including donations of EUR 39,430 from the Stepanenko family, complies with the Law on Financing of Political Organizations (Parties). The answer will be sought on the basis of Section 45(2) of the Law on Political Parties, which empowers a prosecutor to file an application with the court directly on the grounds of point 3¹ of Section 45(1) — where the party's activities endanger State security or contravene the prohibition in Section 7.
The prosecutor is not bound by the SAB's account of the factual circumstances; he must himself assess whether gifts from a father residing in Russia, whose company fulfils military contracts, constitute indirect prohibited financing. Section 3(3) of the Law on Financing of Political Organizations (Parties) prohibits financing parties through third-party intermediaries, which means it must be assessed whether the actual source of the donations is the father rather than the party members. If the prosecutor establishes unlawfully obtained funds, the financing law indicates that the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) may be tasked with deciding on the transfer of those funds to the State budget or the transfer of the property into State ownership. If the review reveals a violation of the party's activities, the first step is usually suspension: the court suspends the party's activities, and during the suspension period the party ceases its public activities — which in practice means a ban on campaigning and agitation. If the party fails to comply with the court's suspension order, fails to remedy the violation within the set period, or repeatedly violates the law within one year of a warning, then, under Section 41 of the Law on Political Parties, this becomes a ground for dissolution. It is precisely in the case of point 3¹ of Section 45 — activities contrary to the prohibition in Section 7(4) or an endangerment of State security — that not only the authorities listed in Section 38 but also a prosecutor may file an application with the court. Matters of liquidation are governed by the Associations and Foundations Law. The objectives set out in the party's programme (abolition of the National Guard, cessation of support to Ukraine) will in this context have to be assessed as substantive evidence of a possible violation of Section 7(4), while the presence of LKS representatives on the list will serve as context for the assessment of the security risk.
Three scenarios are realistically possible.